



American Counterterrorism
Targeting & Resilience Institute

Report

**Shifting Trends in Far-Right and
Militant Jihadi Communication-Based Propaganda**

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The American Counterterrorism Targeting & Resilience Institute (ACTRI) is a cross-disciplinary, nonprofit research organization focused on the broad spectrum of transnational extreme-right, extreme-left, and militant-jihadi political violence. We study the relationships between them and their effect on how ideologies emerge, spread, dominate, and influence countermeasures.



Abstract

Studies that compare the manifestations of far-right and militant jihadi extremist content online are vast and varied.[i] However, there is still an overarching need to more closely explore the intricacies of both far-right and militant jihadi propaganda online, specifically analyzing the qualitative and quantitative aspects of their rhetoric to assist researchers and practitioners in crafting counter-narratives and optimizing detection efforts.

This research will utilize Telegram channels and previous video propaganda research to analyze the existing body of far-right and militant jihadi extremist propaganda videos, featuring ISIS as a case study in the context of the latter. Findings will provide insight into the choices made by far-right and militant jihadi extremists when creating video propaganda by dissecting their techniques and overarching themes. This report will also feature a comprehensive review of material that seeks to synthesize far-right video propaganda by highlighting various elements and their associated impacts. By gaining a further understanding of extremist groups and their strategies, effective actions to counter, neutralize or reduce their influence can be developed.

The findings in this report can be juxtaposed to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each propaganda strategy, allowing researchers and practitioners to understand which areas require more focus and how to effectively dismantle their public relations framework to hinder future radicalization.



Introduction

Current State

Propaganda is a crucial driver of recruitment and radicalization for extremists. Extremists rely on propaganda as a form of advertisement to sell their ideology and persuade others to fall victim to indoctrination. An effective propaganda strategy seeks to attract attention to a group mission while concurrently building memberships through recruitment and empowering those already involved.[ii] Not only do these elements amplify the sustainability of the group, but it allows their ideology to manifest itself beyond a physical space. A variety of propaganda mediums have been used by ideologically driven groups throughout history, such as posters, flyers, magazines, newspapers, film, and television.[iii] While each avenue has their respective advantages, the internet has streamlined propaganda dissemination and attained optimal reach among consumers. The accessibility and connectedness it provides has allowed extremist narratives to be understood and conceptualized around the world.

Psychological Correlation

In addition to uncovering the intricacies behind propaganda development, it is important to first understand the psychological components that serve as a primary driver of indoctrination. The use of propaganda, if executed properly, can yield effective results by triggering reactions from individuals with certain propensities. Research has found that people who desire excitement and adventure can be more susceptible to extremist content,[iv] especially when the content portrays members of the group undertaking real-world actions. Individuals who feel marginalized in society are also at risk, because they are yearning for a sense of belonging.[vi] Propaganda videos respond to these vulnerabilities by making extremist groups seem compelling through actual people, places, and activities that substantiate and reinforce ideological concepts.[vii] Regardless of the ideology pushing the propaganda, the content is likely to trigger an emotional response which helps to establish a preliminary layer of trust and relatability.

Militant Jihadi Propaganda

Case Study Target: ISIS

ISIS is known for its diversity in propaganda as it relies on a multi-platform and multilingual approach to accommodate a vast variety of users to strengthen its appeal.[viii] A combination of positive ISIS narrative, counter speech toward enemies, and weaponized propaganda are used to polarize support. The dissemination of video propaganda is not as widespread in remote parts of Syria and Iraq. During its territorial rule in Syria and Iraq, ISIS had incorporated the use of projectors within various cities that broadcasted beheadings and other acts of violence.[ix] Various “media points” were created by ISIS to serve as operational deployment hubs that ship projectors, chairs, and printers used in the dissemination of ISIS’ narrative. In addition to projector displays, the media hub also supports digital technology efforts like burning electronic magazines onto USB devices and CDs that are locally and remotely distributed. This entity is a primary driver that continues to push the caliphate’s rhetoric to civilians by reinforcing their beliefs.

A 2016 study was conducted by the Islamic State’s media office designed to gauge their level of outreach in the most remote parts of the region.[x] They released a video titled “Raiding the Villages to Spread Guidance,” which featured the media detailing a spike in ISIS recruitment due to propaganda dissemination. The video went on to document the scouting process and displayed members of ISIS distributing pamphlets in local villages, placing a primary emphasis on children because they are typically more vulnerable than adults. Their strategy of maintaining a physical presence within various cities helps to add legitimacy to their cause as individuals can associate their personal experiences with members of ISIS to what they view on the screen. ISIS has been described as adopting a “total propaganda strategy” which goes beyond simple media communication and seeks to embed their values within local populations. To achieve this, their propaganda strategy can be divided into two overlapping factions: consumed propaganda and performative propaganda.

Consumed vs Performative Propaganda

Consumed propaganda encompasses all media that has been received by an audience. This can range from items that are watched, read, or listened to, and exists in various forms: magazines, videos, podcasts, infographics, billboards, etc.[xi] The second category - performative propaganda - works in conjunction with consumed propaganda and are both used to supplement one another. Performative propaganda entails the choreographed physical interactions and rapport building that occurs between ISIS and local populations. These instances generally occur at town fairs, school lessons, public executions or amputations, and mosque sermons. Performative propaganda operations are spread through word of mouth around the community which further enhances their visibility. Repetition helps to create familiarity and trust within the targeted audience and slowly starts to become part of the norm. Thus, by utilizing each technique in tandem, the durability of indoctrination efforts is strengthened and more easily accepted among peers.


Diverse Strategy

While much of society is conditioned to associate ISIS with violence-infused propaganda, their strategy has been diverse to include both a negative and positive undertone. Al-Baghdadi’s technique, for example, was centered on incorporating themes of victimhood, warfare, and utopianism.[xii] The use of imagery to portray victimhood enables viewers to be coerced into the caliphate due to fear. Meanwhile, painting a utopia lures viewers in because of their desire to obtain a better life and achieve happiness. Both techniques address each side of the spectrum and are more powerful when used in combination. However, the drastic use of a “millenarian utopia” is one of their most impactful techniques, despite it being widely unnoticed in mainstream media.[xiii] Its potency can be attributed to the “euphoric, efficient, and functioning Islamic rule” that it portrayed which provides a sense of comfortability and security that ISIS could be a sustainable avenue of life.[xiv] The caliphate is not simply focused on acquiring new recruits, but rather locking in their current brethren through affirmation and uplifting morale. As such, their propaganda strategy was developed with a long-term sustainable framework in mind to aid in survival of not only the physical caliphate, but the ideology as well.

Decline in Video Propaganda Output


A study was conducted by the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) that sought to examine the Islamic State’s propaganda distribution from January 30th, 2017, to February 28th, 2017.[xv] The study uncovered approximately 570 pieces of media that were deployed during this timeframe. Among the sample, nearly 61% were photos, 21% were video clips, 11% were written materials, 5% were audio statements, and 2% were high production videos.[xvi] Not only is it important to consider the quantity of the media, but the quality as well, because that may or may not be linked to subsequent manifestations of violence. Additionally, it can allow researchers to discern which mediums are being used more, and why. Researchers and practitioners can then redirect their efforts to those outlets by examining the appeal, accessibility, and visibility of those platforms to formulate a defection strategy. As can be seen in Figure I below, there is a large disparity between the number of photos produced and the number of video clips created during that time frame.[xvii] There are a few inclinations that may explain the preferability of photos over video clips. Firstly, consumers tend to respond better to content that is direct and concise which is able to be achieved more clearly through the use of images. Additionally, users may have a lower attention span and simply do not want to take the time to watch a video clip. Another potential cause for this could be that since its decline, the Islamic State lacks the resources to produce video content, as this is much more costly and time consuming than creating and circulating an image.

A counterintuitive finding in this report lies within the 2% production rate of feature videos.[xviii] Feature videos consist of larger production films that ISIS has previously reaped benefit from, as the caliphate is well-known for their dramatic productions. Since ISIS barely produced any during this timeframe it could be indicative of a struggle to achieve financial and operational resources that would allow them to produce more content in such a short timeframe. A few months after this study was conducted, ISIS was struggling to maintain its last remnants of the city of Raqqa, which is likely to have consumed the majority of their manpower and other resources. While they lost total control in December of 2017, their propaganda output has not shown any concrete signs of attaining momentum. At the height of their reign in the summer of 2015, ISIS produced nearly 892 propaganda-related items, representing a 36% drop when compared to the 2017 study.[xix]



Source: The ISIS Propaganda Decline.

As can be compared in Figure II and Figure III below, there was a dramatic shift in propaganda theme output from a Utopian society to strictly warfare.[xx] As previously alluded, this change is likely in part due to their struggle to maintain control over the city of Raqqa which they were struggling with during the latter part of 2017. By incorporating the concept of war in their narratives it appears they were attempting to recruit those that would be willing to fight. In 2015, ISIS was at the height of its power which casted a more positive and inviting aura in their propaganda. This can be visibly translated to Figure II, as the main focus was illustrating a utopia with a sense of strength, happiness, and purpose.



Source: The ISIS Propaganda Decline.

An additional study was conducted by the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliya, Israel, to determine the intricacies that help mold ISIS propaganda.[xxi] The study was conducted from June 2014 to December 2016 to uncover the patterns and evolution of messages overtime, target audiences, and shifts in self-presentation. Approximately 1,102 videos were published during this timeframe and a random sample of 120 videos were selected for further analysis. Among the sample, a variety of themes were identified, ranging from military capabilities, to religious messages, to utopian life, to governance. Approximately 57% of the sample contained actions of extreme violence, 20% deterrence and power, 6% governance, and only 5% were religiously tailored.[xxii] The majority of videos analyzed during this time featured acts of violence which can most likely be attributed to the Islamic State’s frustrations and struggle of power. In relation to target audiences, the study revealed that nearly 63% of those targeted were current ISIS members/supporters.[xxiii]

This metric substantiates prior consensus that ISIS strives to build long-term sustainable relationships with their fighters to maintain loyalty. Over 60% of the videos reviewed were related to a specific attack or event, assumingly seeking legitimacy and credibility among their targeted audience. An interesting metric that is often overlooked encompasses the ways in which ISIS chooses to present itself. For example, the study identified 74% of the videos as containing “information about ISIS and 98% show the organization’s symbol or flag.”[xxiv] The manner in which ISIS is portrayed needs to be carefully thought out as it can easily be misinterpreted by consumers of the material and deliver the wrong message. For example, ISIS can illustrate itself through a lens of strength, dominance, and control which adversaries may see as a challenge.

Propaganda and COVID-19

A more recent depiction regarding the output of ISIS propaganda during the coronavirus pandemic illustrates a strong desire to remain widespread and relevant within society. The emergence of COVID-19 caused various shutdowns and a lack of social gathering and interaction across the world. While this seemingly created limitations for extremists to scout and recruit new supporters, ISIS quickly focused their efforts on the internet, a potent source of mobilization. Tik-Tok has been their primary driver of dissemination since late 2019 and began to spike when more users began to rely on the social media apps due to the pandemic.[xxv] Propaganda videos on Tik-Tok are “meticulously edited, tailored to young people’s viewing habits, and designed to attract their attention through rhyme, rhythmic music and singing, heart icons, and quick, dynamic messages that are easily imprinted on the memory.”[xxvi] All of these elements exacerbate the impact of ISIS propaganda as well as the likelihood of acquiring new recruits. In addition to exploiting Tok-Tok during the pandemic, ISIS also relied heavily on distributing their magazine online.[xxvii]

The Voice of Hind is an English version of a popular magazine designed and distributed by ISIS supporters in India that strategically used the coronavirus pandemic to their advantage.[xxviii] The magazine issued a “Lock-Down Special” issue that portrayed the world as “diseased” and encouraged others to engage in violence, insinuating the pandemic emerged due to Allah’s rage toward the enemy.[xxix] Sympathizers believed that COVID-19 was spread to plague non-believers and their job was to intensify the devastation by intentionally contracting and dispersing the virus further into society. Utilizing COVID-19 as a weapon was a strong proponent of their strategy to polarize various demographics and create a divide between ISIS supporters and non-believers. To evoke an even deeper emotional response among adherents, the magazine referenced a quote used by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi that urged those who are curious about the caliphate to join and help fight “every Muslims war.”[xxx] The magazine offered ideas on how to kill the perceived enemy with not only the coronavirus, but scissors, ropes, chains, hammers, and glass as well.[xxxi]

Security and law enforcement officials were heavily distracted and burdened by the pandemic, creating a vulnerability ISIS could exploit. As a result, an additional deployment of the magazine was launched, which placed an emphasis on using weapons to harm law enforcement officers who were enforcing curfews and social distancing.[xxxii] The magazine suggested several methods to inflict harm, such as food or drink poisoning, knife attacks, vehicle attacks, and arson. Not only was their goal to attract recruits throughout the pandemic, but to more importantly cause harm to others and continue fulfilling Allah’s mission. Quraysh Media, an ISIS-supporting based company, was also leveraged to promote COVID-19 related propaganda. A batch of posters were released in the beginning of 2020 depicting a person in a hazmat suit with a respirator containing the words “China: coronavirus.”[xxxiii] By promoting anti-sentiment thought, it not only enlarges the divide among various demographics, but also creates a perceived common enemy. The “us” versus “them” mentality will continue to fester and generate a social stigma, which has the ability to instigate lone-wolf attacks among those that feel alienated and ostracized.

Far-Right Extremist Propaganda

From 2014 to 2018, far-right extremist incidents increased by 320%^[xxxiv] in conjunction with a 123% increase in white supremacist propaganda output from 2018 to 2019.^[xxxv] The dramatic uptick in far-right extremist incidents can in part be attributed to the increase in internet and social media use by extremists.^[xxxvi] This correlation between the rise in propaganda and extremist related incidents is a cause-and-effect relationship that has long been studied. However, understanding why extremist groups have been so effective at inciting and maintaining violence requires additional intervention to stifle this impact moving forward. The leadership of far-right movements utilize a variety of platforms to disseminate content about white nationalism, antifeminism, white genocide, the great replacement, antisemitism and more.^[xxxvii] These platforms range from mainstream social media sites (Facebook, YouTube, Tik-Tok) to alternative-tech services (Gab, Telegram, Signal).^[xxxviii] Users often take advantage of the public and private features that various social media platforms provide. For example, public channels and groups are used to disseminate propaganda to a wide audience of users. Established members within the extremist community, however, tend to use private features such as encrypted chats to discuss training and group-related planning. In the 2020 Michigan terror plot against the governor Gretchen Whitmer, the militia group, the Wolverine Watchmen, utilized both public and private channels. The group posted subversive content on Facebook and YouTube, including one video of a member pretending to fire weapons while wearing a shirt with anti-government messaging.^[xl] FBI investigators were also able to infiltrate encrypted communications wherein the perpetrators planned and discussed aspects of the plot.^[xli]

Subversive Exposure

A technique commonly used in right-wing extremist propaganda to radicalize individuals is known as “subversive exposure.”^[xlii] This occurs when extremist beliefs are covertly embedded in a product that involves mainstream culture or appeals to humor. A QAnon Tik-Tok account, for example, posted conspiracy content about the Ever-Given ship blocking the Suez Canal.^[xliii] By circulating media on current events, they are able to spread their ideas to a receptive audience that will view trending news. The widespread dissemination of these seemingly innocuous materials to an unassuming audience results in gradual view normalization where, because the content is appealing, the views within it become more acceptable.^[xliv] Video content utilizing subversive techniques primarily takes the form of rock music videos, demonstrations, and presentations.^[xlv] These videos are often crafted with the intention to appear serious and informational,^[xlvi] but carry a revolutionary pathos.^[xlvii] Additionally, another strategy is to use the video content creators themselves and the feeling of community they foster in their videos and the comment sections. Leveraging this feeling of an audience-creator relationship, extremists can further sell the ideology.^[xlviii]

Demographics and Tactics

When deploying recruitment-based propaganda, extremists target specific audiences by altering their approach to appear more relatable. Targeted populations typically include youths, gamers, and veterans. [xlix] Young people are frequently targeted because they are considered to be digital natives and therefore less likely to perceive propaganda materials as being inherently misleading, and so can aid in dissemination. Extremist groups attempt to appeal to youth by creating materials that both reference their lifestyles[l] and integrate humor. Neo-Nazi memes and propaganda, for example, will often include humorous images of characters like “Pepe the Frog” and “baby Cheems” (a dog) that attract views from youth, but they also embed their messages along with these images to stimulate thought.[li]

Additionally, narratives within propaganda targeting youth address insecurities like identity issues and feelings of victimization, and then present joining the group as a solution. Some youths may be susceptible to far-right extremist messages mentioning feelings of victimization, identity issues, and desire to belong. Groups have also created a presence on video game and streaming platforms to recruit and radicalize teenagers,[lii] where members can communicate with players via spoken or text chat rooms. Game-related chats on Reddit and Discord are also places of propaganda dissemination and recruitment.[liii] It has been reported that within these various gaming chats, extremists will often state racial and religious slurs to players to gauge their response, and then escalate to sending propaganda.[liv] Efforts to influence youth and gamer populations have been successful, with 682 children referred to the UK Counter-Terrorism Program Channel from 2017-2018.[lv] Propaganda has increased and become well-tailored for recruitment in youth populations.

Active duty and military veterans are another target of far-right extremist propaganda because their tactical knowledge and competency of weapons can increase their capabilities.[lvi] Extremists targeting this group appeal to the grievances that military personnel may experience. Individuals may feel marginalized, perceive the government as threatening to American freedom,[lvii] and desire to preserve their military identity.[lviii] Propaganda content aimed at recruiting from the military utilizes military jargon and jokes, as well as attempts to give off the perception of collective identity and community present among extremists.[lix] Among the January 2021 U.S. Capitol Riots participants, at least 52 individuals, approximately 13%, were identified as active or retired employees of the government, military, or law enforcement.[lx] The precise push/pull factor that led those individuals to engage in violence is unknown, but it can be discerned that propaganda and media coverage surrounding the outcome of the election played a critical role in their decision to resort to violence. A U.S. government survey of 17,080 soldiers revealed that 3.5% of the soldiers interviewed had faced right-wing extremist recruitment efforts, and 7.1% knew of a soldier that may be a part of an extremist organization.[lxi] Efforts to recruit members continue, and participation in extremist activities from members of this demographic is dangerous given the knowledge and experience possessed by military personnel.

Methodology

Far-Right Extremism


To understand the use of videos for spreading far-right extremist propaganda, five prominent U.S based groups were selected by the authors of this article to be analyzed. To obtain a selection of each group's propaganda videos, the encrypted content platform Telegram was utilized. Public Telegram channels dedicated to the respective groups were found first through the general search bar and then through snowball techniques. The authors used the keywords "Atomwaffen," "Oath Enforcers," "Patriot Front," "Proud Boys," and "Patriot Prayer" to find the relevant channels. The videos selected to be analyzed were uploaded from February 2020-May 2021. In total, 50 videos were analyzed in this report. The videos collected in each channel were analyzed primarily qualitatively (imagery and stylistic techniques). The quantitative results were not relied upon because of the limited access to source material. As such, the conclusions are not necessarily determinative but rather indicative of common themes and elements which could be affirmed through a more comprehensive survey.

Findings

Music Trends in Video Propaganda

When examining the sample of videos, the authors were able to identify thematic characteristics and analyze the potential impact of each element. As seen in Figure IV below, for example, although the background music varied throughout the sampling, 16% of the videos featured variations of hard-driving rock music, which reinforces previous research findings that rock music is prevalent in right-wing videos. [lxii] This is likely because it has connotations of brotherhood, anger, and rebellion,[lxiii] and studies have shown that fans of this music are likely to dislike authority.[lxiv] Utilizing this music reinforces the drive of the messages in propaganda and would likely attract a receptive audience.


The other predominant genre of music was Electronic (10%), with the remainder being "Experimental" (8%) with high-intensity beats, unidentifiable (by the music analysis app Shazam), or another genre. Electronic music is also used because the rhythm and beats are psychologically compelling and serves to reinforce the feelings associated with the images and words.[lxiv] While music was a feature of all videos in the sampling, it was not edited or synched to the images and action, but instead was a thematically related overlay.



Source: Authors

Editing Styles and Content Trends in Video Propaganda


Additionally, editing styles varied among the groups; however, all videos analyzed featured sudden cuts and simple edited overlays. The simplicity of these videos indicates that creating propaganda videos is both easy and accessible for a variety of individuals and groups. An average frame length of 6 seconds is standard for modern videos in order to appear compelling.[lxvi] As visualized in Figure V below, 36% of videos relied on one source of material, such as videotaping a group activity, while 64% were a compilation of multiple materials such as (see Figure VI) showcasing different group activities, cartoons (15%), news clips (27%), or historical footage (22%). Certain visual elements were also present in some of the videos. For example, 22% of videos had flashing and repeated showings of the group logos or other prominent symbols throughout the main footage. Since groups want viewers to remember its “brand,” the use of repetition of imagery is strategically embedded to attract more credibility.[lxvii]



Source: Authors

Membership Depiction Trends in Video Propaganda


Of the videos sampled and as depicted in Figure VII, 76% focused on clips of subversive activities conducted by the groups. These activities included members illicitly putting up posters and stickers in public spaces, hanging banners and flags, perpetrating minor acts of vandalism, and conducting various firearms and tactical training. These videos also often featured compilations from public protests and demonstrations frequently including footage and images of group members engaging in fighting, chanting, and marching taken from the regular media coverage. The goal is to have the target audiences, having identified with the feeling of anger and messages, presented with real ways that their rage can be manifested into a goal-oriented activity. It also reinforces the credibility of the group to not only show the membership size, but also that the group is about speeches, rhetoric, and engaging in goal-oriented actions. This is opposed to only 24% of videos that featured only one person or did not feature a person. Group activity is frequently featured in video propaganda to attract viewers looking for inclusion and community.



Source: Authors

Text Trends in Video Propaganda

In terms of spoken and visual text in the videos, as seen in Figure VII, 24% of the videos featured an individual directly speaking to the camera or a voice-over narration. On the other hand, 56% of the videos featured text on the screen. Social media information, including websites and channels, was featured in 42% of the videos. This suggests that since groups use propaganda to recruit, posting social media information would provide further information to viewers about the groups, repeat and reinforce its name, and aid in increasing engagement and membership. It is important for groups to have a call to action, such as following social media accounts, for what needs to be done and the next steps that can be taken.



Source: Authors

Leader Presence Trends in Video Propaganda

For groups with a recognized leader or with a recognized influencer contributor like James Mason and George Lincoln Rockwell of the Atomwaffen Division, clips included part of the individual discussing their philosophy or a narrator reading a famous work. For example, the Atomwaffen Division propaganda videos frequently reference *Siege* by James Mason. These speech excerpts focused on emphasizing one aspect of their philosophy. As propaganda, the arguments were always one-sided and did not acknowledge counter arguments or other evidence. Additionally, the incorporation of these leaders into videos serves to make the group appear more powerful and credible, as people tend to respect those in positions of power and are more likely to listen to them and believe what they have to say to be true.

Social Media Trends in Video Propaganda

Although not explicitly stated, 60% of the videos claim to be fighting for the truth, while the channels, websites, and social media handles are listed to help further recruit members by directing them to sources of additional information and propaganda. Additionally, groups often utilize these videos to reinforce that they have a subversive, but real presence and the ability to act upon that presence. For these videos, they utilize the images of their organizational leadership or their activities to demonstrate that there are real people in the group. This finding also indicates that these groups are not trying to establish complex philosophical arguments, but rather are simplistic and compelling visceral messages. The general trend of the content shows that the videos are often recruitment oriented. Far-right extremists utilized this medium not only to promote their propaganda directly on these channels, but to also encourage their followers to repost videos and promote their cause.

Conclusion

The creation and dissemination of video propaganda by far-right and militant jihadi extremists continues to serve as a primary growth and mobilization strategy. Historical trends have shown that extremists embrace change and are constantly evolving in order to remain pressing and relevant to keep their ideologies flourishing. This research not only substantiates this claim, but it also delves deeper into how extremists are maintaining visibility in such a diverse and crowded online space. Among far-right extremists, various trends in video content such as music selection, clip division, individuals featured, and subtitling were all strategically selected to promote the most impactful version and maintain momentum. While ISIS may have fluctuated, this representation of militant jihadi propaganda illustrated variances in productivity, reflective upon the current state of caliphate. Overall, it is important to understand content trends, fluctuations, and anomalies as it can be indicative of a potential change in capability and strength: two elements that CT-CVE researchers and practitioners are consistently analyzing to develop the most effective defection strategy.

About the Authors

Emma Scupp is a Research Fellow at the American Counterterrorism Targeting and Resilience Institute (ACTRI), where she focuses on domestic extremism research. She is an undergraduate student at the University of Pittsburgh majoring in Administration of Justice and minoring in Chinese. She has had internship experiences with the American Red Cross, the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), and Rise to Peace.

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Endnotes

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